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INT RODUCT ION
Albert Camus once wrote that “all men’s misery stems from the fact that he
does not know how to use a simple language.”1 Even though legal language is
seen as an “instrument of social control and social intercourse,” 2 regrettably, this
language is “highly technical” and, consequently, “incomprehensible to the
layman.”3 It also promotes judicial indecisiveness. 4
A clear and demonstrable example of obfuscation in the language of law is
found within the tort of negligence. Indeed, it has been suggested that the
negligence doctrine is sustained “more by its accommodating imprecision than
by the clarity of its beacons.”5 Monochromatic colorings—tints, tones, and
shades—subfuse this tort and are manifested vividly in the calculus of causation,
which triggers the use of negligence as a legal cause of action. 6 While defined
previously as embodying the philosophical ideal of justice and the economic
standard of efficiency, 7 the theory of negligence was found—as early as 1980—
to be “losing . . . battles” because any effort at systematic analytical thinking
“poorly reproduces the proper roles of social efficiency and justice in the
analysis of tort cases.”8
1. Robert Zaretsky, Moderate Rebel, T IMES LITERARY SUP P LEMENT, Jan. 8, 2016, at 22
(reviewing EDWARD J. HUGHES, ALBERT CAMUS (2015)) (quoting a letter from Albert Camus to
Louis Guilloux).
2. Karl Olivercrone, Legal Language and Reality, in ESSAYS IN JURISP RUDENCE IN HONOR
OF ROSCOE P OUND 151, 177 (Ralph A. Newman ed. 1962) [hereinafter E SSAYS IN
JURISP RUDENCE ].
3. Id. at 151.
4. MAYO MORAN , RETHINKING THE REASONABLE P ERSON : AN EGALITARIAN
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD 13 (2003).
5. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Negligence Reconsidered: The Role of Rationality in Tort
Theory, 54 S. CAL . L. REV. 1, 34 (1980).
6. See generally W ILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. P OSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF T ORT L AW 228–29 (1987).
7. Rodgers, supra note 5, at 2.
8. Inasmuch as there is a discernible drift in the law of torts which imposes liability without
any moral blame, some have asserted that the consequence of this position is that negligence is
losing “ its character as a branch of faulty liability”—especially since this drift results in requiring
the “ innocent to pay for the damage they do.” Because of this consequence, it is urged “that
negligence should therefore largely be jettisoned.” W. P AGE KEETON ET AL ., P ROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF T ORTS Ch. 13, § 75 (5th ed. 1984).
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In order to rehabilitate the weakness of the tort of negligence, two models
have, in the past, been suggested: “the rational decisionmaking model”9 and “the
nontraditional decisionmaking model.”10 Under the first model, “when an
injurer acts rationally strict liability should be imposed.” 11 Alternatively, under
the second model, when behavior is determined to be non-rational and “of
psychological origin . . . [l]iability should be imposed . . . only for failure to meet
a subjective ‘best efforts’ test”—because, this type of behavior must be judged
“unsuited to a social cost-benefit analysis.”12 The foundational complication to
this second analytical construct lies in the harsh reality that many—if, indeed,
not most—social interactions are neither commenced nor completed in rational
ways which can be predicted satisfactorily by economists. 13 Human behavioral
patterns are recognized as “nonrational . . . and the product of reflex, habit, or
snap judgment.”14
Today, concerns over the complexities of both applying and strengthening the
tort of negligence remain. 15 Since in America, it is estimated that 14% of the
population—or, some 32,000,000 adults—cannot read at a basic level and thus
are impaired cognitively, 16 it is understandable that the “demise of the average,
ordinary reasonable person” has been accepted and recorded. 17 In a very real
way, this statistical profile raises the question regarding the extent to which the

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Rodgers, supra note 5, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. See also RICHARD A. P OSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 20 (8th ed. 2011);
RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN I NFERENCE : STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF
SOCIAL JUDGMENT xi (1980).
15. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonableness In and Out of Negligence Law, 163 U. P A. L.
REV. 2131, 2135–37 (2015) (discussing the complexities in tort law stemming from variations in
the use of “ reasonableness”).
16. Illiteracy
Statistics,
STATISTIC
BRAIN
(July
22,
2017),
http://www.statisticbrain.com/number-of-american-adults-who-cant-read/ (Aug. 22, 2016).
Worldwide, it is estimated 775,000,000 people cannot read. Id. Another source, the Program for
the International Assessment of Adult Competencies, determined in 2013 that there were
36,000,000 adults in the United States reading at a level below an average third grade level and
that, for every six adults, one has low literacy skills. OECD, T IME FOR THE U.S. TO RESKILL ?:
W HAT THE SURVEY OF ADULT SKILLS SAYS 12 (OECD Publishing, ed. 2013),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264204904-en.
17. George P. Smith, II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an Historical Revisionist
Theory of Contemporary Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REV. 658, 733 (1995); see also
MORAN supra note 4, at 2.
Interestingly, the contemporary relevance of the notion of the average, ordinary person
finds pertinence—it is argued—when acts of autonomous computer tortfeasors come into play and
these acts are tested by the traditional negligence paradigm where unreasonable conduct establishes
liability. Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort Liability, 86
GEO . W ASH . L. REV. 1, 5, 7 (2018).
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judicial system should safeguard “economic well-being”18 for those members of
society with cognitive impairment. Given that a central ingredient of society’s
very qualities of life is found within the notion of economic liberty, 19 a strong
argument can be made for protecting this special class of citizens. 20 Either by
statutory enactment or by judicial oversight and interpretation based on
principles of equity, efforts can and should be undertaken to safeguard the
economic well-being of citizens who are impaired cognitively. With the demise
of the notion of an average, ordinary, reasonable person—so central to
establishing causation—the use and application of the tort of negligence is made
even more cumbersome and, indeed, confounding. 21
This Article presents a third alternative—or what could be viewed as a new
analytical construct and seen as an unintended consequence for legal advocacy
and for judicial decision-making—to dealing with the ongoing vicissitudes of
the tort of negligence and the uncertainties of its application: namely, greater
reliance and utilization of the tort of nuisance through alternative pleading
allowed under Rule 8(a)(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 22
Utilizing Sections 822, 827, and 828 of The Restatement (Second) of Torts, 23
this Article urges, specifically, a template—if not an effective construct—for
determining when an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of
property arises and is, thus seen, as a nuisance. 24 No ablation of the tort of
negligence is proposed. Rather, merely, a greater policy recognition and shift
from negligence as a controlling and all-dominating civil wrong to a more
manageable one in the tort of nuisance, through reliance on a cost/benefit test
for determining when conduct is unreasonable, and thus, actionable.
While this policy shift, together with acceptance of the reality that the ideal of
an average, ordinary, reasonable person—so essential to proving causation in
negligence—is exceedingly problematic, if not indeed moribund, 25 the judiciary
must now assume wider oversight of cases where issues of cognitive capacity
are in play. When uneven bargaining positions are found to exist, particularly
in predatory lending cases and contracts of adhesion, the courts must exercise
their broad equitable powers under the doctrine of powers parens patriae in

18.
19.

Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. W ILEY , P UBLIC HEALTH LAW : P OWER, DUTY ,
RESTRAINT 473 (rev. & expanded 2d ed. 2008).
20. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis of the
Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 923, 923 (1993)
(discussing the scope of protected classes created by statute).
21. MORAN , supra note 4, at 13. See generally Abbott, supra note 17.
22. STEVEN BAILKER MCKEE ET AL ., FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS HANDBOOK 358, 359, (2014).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF T ORTS §§ 822, 827–828 (AM. LAW I NST. 1979).
24. See generally Smith, supra note 17.
25. See MORAN , supra note 4, at 13; see generally John Gardner, The Many Faces of the
Reasonable Person, 131 L.Q. REV. 563 (2015).
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order to protect the integrity of the contractual relationship, and thereby protect
the economic well-being of the citizenry. 26
Part I of this Article lays the predicate for examining the symbiotic
relationship of capitalism, economic efficiency, and the law. This interrelationship is then explored and tested throughout the Article. Part II considers
challenges to reasonableness, the impact of heuristics on reasoned decisionmaking and two flagrant examples of how the economic well-being of the
cognitively impaired is affected by predatory lending practice and lax judicial
oversight of structured settlements. Part III evaluates the consequences of the
“demise” of the average, ordinary, reasonable person through a careful study of
the equitable powers of the judiciary to guide and “protect” the cognitively
impaired not only through the parens patriae powers, but also by clear and
sensible judicial decisions which validate the right of economic well-being for
those impaired cognitively who seek corrective justice. Part IV tackles the
actual legal consequences of encountering ambiguities arising from the growing
displacement and/or demise of the average, ordinary reasonable person theory,
internalized in establishing causation in order to prove the tort of negligence.
Part V suggests a policy for encouraging alternative pleading for negligence and
nuisance and the use of the cost/benefit test for determining the reasonableness
of conduct—as set out by The Restatement of Torts—as an effective way to
bypass the complexities and uncertainties of proof which result from holding
fast to the doctrine of causation, hobbled though it may be. Part VI investigates
a paradigmatic case of alternative pleading in order to test the strengths and
weaknesses of pleading in this manner and concludes that this shift in policy—
from traditional normative standards of reasonable personhood to use of an
economic cost/benefit template for determining when conduct is unreasonable—
will go far in achieving a more efficient and expeditious administration of
justice. This Article concludes by reaffirming the breadth and the power of the
standard of reasonableness to strengthen the very goal of law: namely, to secure
economic or corrective justice when an injurious abridgement of it occurs.
I. CAPIT ALISM, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY,

AND T HE LAW

First used as a word of art in 1854, capitalism still—today—is defined rarely,
but used frequently. 27 A working consensus of the word’s taxonomy, however,
finds economists applying the word to issues of protection, consumption and
distribution of market resources. 28 Historians use a broader brush to define
capitalism—approaching it as a socio-economic system emphasizing social
26. George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or
Tyrant?, 25 DE P AUL L. REV. 895, 907–911 (1976).
27. T HE OXFORD ENCYCLOP EDIA OF ECONOMIC HISTORY 195 (Joel Mokyr ed. 2003)
available at http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195105070.001.0001/acr
ef9780195105070?btog=chap&hide=true&pageSize=100&skipEditions=true&sort=titlesort&sou
rce=%2F10.1093%2Facref%2F9780195105070.001.0001%2Facref -9780195105070.2003).
28. Id.
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groupings within the government and the interdependence of these groups with
political and economic institutions. 29
The classical definition of capitalism is that it is “an economic system
characterized by private or corporate ownership of capital goods by investments
that are determined by private decisions, and by prices, production, and the
distribution of goods that are determined mainly by competition in a free
market.”30 Modernly, it has been suggested that the phrase, “age of betterment,”
is preferable to “the age of capitalism” because of the alternative interpretations
of the components of capitalism. 31
Although varying interpretations of the definition and the provenance of
capitalism exist, what is more certain is that the Common Law is viewed
properly “as a system for promoting economic efficiency.” 32 The commitment
to efficiency is strong yet is not seen as total. 33 Indeed, there is an ever-present
tension between efficiency and morality. 34 This tension is more theoretical than
real simply because the very principle “of law embodied in [both] the common
law of England and of the United States[] is to correct injustices and thereby
vindicate the moral sense.”35
While there may be a discrepancy between “efficien[t] maximization and
notions of the just distribution of wealth,”36 it is well to remember that in a
market economy the roles for the law and for the government are “limited to
controlling externalities and reducing transaction costs.” 37 This is the extent to
which economic efficiency requires. 38 Inequalities in the distribution of income
and wealth arise—and in turn generate substantial inequalities—because of the
differences in not only the tastes and abilities of individuals, their levels of
education and cognition, but also in their “luck.”39 It is submitted that those who
live within the system of capitalism as capitalists may be expected to conduct
themselves in an efficient way designed to maximize their wealth and,

29.
30.
31.

Id.
Capitalism , MERRIAM-W EBSTER’ S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 183 (11th ed. 2003).
DEIDRE NANSEN MCCLOSKEY , BOURGEOIS EQUALITY : HOW I DEAS, NOT CAP ITAL OR
I NSTITUTIONS, ENRICHED THE W ORLD 94–100 (2016). Differing views of the development of the
economic history of capitalism are found at 94–100 and Chapter 12. Id.
32. See P OSNER, supra note 14, at 342; see also James Boyd White, Economics and Law:
Two Cultures in Tension, 54 T ENN . L. REV. 161, 163 (1987) (discussing the origin of the
“ economic” view of the law).
33. See P OSNER, supra note 14, at 344.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 342.
36. Id. at 344.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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subsequently, happiness. 40 Stated otherwise, the average person assuredly acts
rationally so as to maximize self-interests. 41 Money, which is but a natural
product of human economy, is a medium through which a harmony of needs is
achieved. 42 It remains for the courts, then—as architects and gatekeepers of the
standards of reasonableness—to, in their decision-making, strive to issue
reasonable opinions that reflect the philosophy of a capitalistic society.
II. CHALLENGES T O REASONABLENESS
Reasonable conduct and rational decision-making are expected of all in their
day-to-day conduct. 43 Indeed, economists have postured that, in order to
maximize self-interest, the average person should act rationally. 44 Rational
actions include: full knowledge of risks, identification of options, and
deliberative assessment of costs and benefits, together with a practice of
calculated choices over time. 45 Testing the extent to which conduct has failed
to meet the standard of reasonableness and/or behavior is irrational is central to
the judiciary’s duty to resolve conflicts and provide a level of corrective justice
which is seen, hopefully, if not accepted, as sensible decision-making.
Theoretically, at least, a capitalist shall be dedicated by a need to be rational as
well as a coordinated need to maximize personal wealth.
Reasonable is defined as “sensible” and equals or is synonymous with
“rational.”46 One “endowed with . . . reason” is reasonable47 and “not
irrational.”48 Rational is defined as “endowed with reason”49 and “having sound
judgment,” being “sensible.”50
Sensible, finally, is defined as “easily
understood,”51 “reasonable, judicious,”52 “proceeding from good sense.”53

40. UNDERSTANDING HUMAN W ELL -BEING 4–5 (Mark McGillivray & Matthew Clarke eds.,
2006); BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, HAP P INESS AND ECONOMICS: HOW THE ECONOMY AND
I NSTITUTIONS AFFECT W ELL -BEING 75–76 (2002).
41. E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38,
85 (1985). Ideally, maximizing self-interest and advancing economic well-being promotes
happiness for all and is the center goal of utilitarianism. See Jedediah Purdy, Response, A Few
Questions About the Social-Obligation Norm , 94 CORNELL L. REV. 949, 955 (2009).
42. Smith, supra note 17, at 677.
43. See Elliot, supra note 41, at 85–87.
44. Id. See also Smith, supra note 17, at 721.
45. VICTOR ALEXANDER T HOMP SON , DECISION THEORY , P URE AND AP PLIED 3–16 (1971).
46. Reasonable, 13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 291 (2d. ed. 1998).
47. Id.
48. Id. “ A reasonable person” is rare. Id.
49. Rational, 13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 218(A) (2d. ed. 1998).
50. Id.
51. Sensible, 14 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 980–84 (2d ed. 1998).
52. Id. at 983 (14a).
53. Id. at 984 (14b).
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Heuristics as an Impediment to Reasoned Decision Making

Heuristics, termed “mental shortcuts,” are a common vector of force in
cognitive analysis and often allow “good decisions” to be made. 54 Yet when
assessments of probabilities are inaccurate and “generalizations are wrenched
out of context and treated as freestanding or universal principles,” a rational
method for sound decision-making is lacking. 55
In moral and political decision-making, there is a ready reliance on “simple
rules of thumb.”56 Indeed, “highly intuitive rules” form a foundation for much
of a common sense course of action. 57 Decisions may well fail, however, when
biases are too dominate in these rules. 58 Probabilities are very often assessed
through reliance upon various heuristics—notably, probabilities. 59 And, a
probability is measured typically by “asking whether a readily available example
comes to mind.”60
B. Low Student Achievement in Secondary Education
The Education Commission of the States has raised serious concerns that
student achievement at the secondary level is decreasing significantly. 61
Nationally, an analysis of the Class of 2014 found that thirty-two states failed to
require graduates take four years of English as well as Mathematics through
Algebra II or its equivalent. 62 Indeed, California, South Carolina, and Tennessee
recently eliminated rules that required students pass final or exit exams in order
to qualify for a diploma. 63 Experts have found “[r]eading comprehension is a
cognitive process that requires myriad skills and strategies.”64 Given these
54. CASS R. SUNSTEIN , VALUING LIFE : HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE 137 (2014).
See also RALP H HERWIG ET AL ., SIMP LE HEURISTICS IN A SOCIAL W ORLD VIII (2013).
55. SUNSTEIN , supra note 54, at 138.
56. Id. at 137.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 137–38.
59. Id. at 155.
60. Id. See also Daniel Kahneman & Amos T versky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of
Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE P SYCHOLOGY 430, 430 (1972); Amos T versky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974).
61. Motoko Rich, Graduation Rates Rise, Experts Fear Diplomas Come Up Short, N.Y.
T IMES, Dec. 26, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/27/us/as-graduation-rates-rise-expertsfear-standards-have-fallen.html.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Lucy Hart, Cognitive Factors That Affect Reading Comprehension , SEATTLE P OSTI NTELLIGENCER, http://education.seattlepi.com/cognitive-factors-affect-reading-comprehension1591.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2017); see also Michael S. Roth, Why Johnny (Still) Can’t Read,
T HE W ALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2017, 7:03 P.M., https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-johnny-still-cantread-1484093037 (concluding that teaching children how to read has become problematic because
two-thirds of children score at low levels of competency, which, in turn, not only impairs literacy,
but also compromises cognitive development or the ability to think, understand, and comm unicate);
but see Richard L. Cupp, Cognitively Impaired Humans, Intelligent Animals, and Legal
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statistics, it is relatively easy to predict the burdensome societal challenges
facing the Nation ahead when more and more of its citizens are incapable of
being informed and educated sufficient to allow them to function in the market
place and not only understand the laws and regulations there, but also in other
social exchanges: the ability to make rational choices will be limited severely.65
Cognitive limitations inhibit the ability to make rational choices. 66 Being
rational endows one with “the faculty of reasoning,”67 and the ability to make
reasonable, sound, sensible judgments. 68 For economists, rationality is tested
objectively, not subjectively. 69 The foundational assumption that human
behavior is rational, however, seems contradicted by the “systemic departures
from rationality”70 found in everyday life experiences. 71
C. Payday Loans
An associated issue with safeguarding the economic well-being of cognitively
impaired individuals can be seen with the practice of “payday loans.”72 This
predatory lending practice allows money to be borrowed against paychecks,
typically with a provision that the borrowed sums are paid back within a short

Personhood, 69 FLA . L. REV. 465, 502 (2017) (stating that assertions of this nature are an
inappropriate reason for abridging or withholding rights of autonomous decision-making and
concluding that cognitive capacity should be but one factor in asserting the extent to which such
impairments compromise the “ dignity interests” of such individuals as “ a part of the human
community”).
65. See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY , BELL CURVE : I NTELLIGENCE AND
CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 269–70 (1994) (arguing the existence of genetic, racial, and
class differences with regard to intelligence); but see, T HE BELL CURVE W ARS: RACE ,
I NTELLIGENCE , AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA 5 (Steven Fraser, ed. 1995) (arguing lack of
documentation for the Herrnstein and Murray thesis regarding differences in I.Q. and concluding
until equal educational opportunities for all races exist, there will be evil disparities here); see also
P HILIP E. VERNON , I NTELLIGENCE : HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT 128 (1979) (posturing that the
gap between environmental and genetic effects on intelligence is much smaller than believed
originally).
T homas Sowell attacks what is termed the socio-economic theory of invincible fallacy.
Under this fallacy, different outcomes between people of different races or sexes are held to result
from discrimination. Sowell asserts, however, that it is because of differing interests and
capabilities and backgrounds that differing outcomes occur. T his argument, thus, is in more in
keeping with the idea of the environment, rather than genetic heritage, being determinative of
cognitive development. See generally T HOMAS SOWELL , DISCRIMINATION AND DISP ARITIES
(2018).
66. See P OSNER, supra note 14, at 24.
67. Rational, 13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 218 (2d ed. 1998).
68. Id.
69. See P OSNER, supra note 14, at 24.
70. Id. at 22.
71. Id. at 20.
72. See Mark Oppenheimer, Full Faith and Credit: Christians Unite Against Predatory
Lending, N.Y. T IMES, June 10, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/11/us/full-faith-andcredit-christian-groups-unite-against-predatory-lending.html.
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period of time—normally two weeks. 73 Payday offices are normally located
near the working poor. 74 Interestingly, in Maryland, it is reported that there are
more offices of this type “than Walmart, Starbucks and McDonald’s
combined.”75 Payday loans are accompanied by high interest rates; for instance,
in Missouri, the payday loan’s annual interest rate cap is “1,950 percent.” 76
Indeed, the average interest charge for payday loans is “450 percent A.P.R.” 77
These situations in both Maryland and Missouri show not only the need for
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to re-double its effort at pay lending
reform designed to cap credit interest for everyone at possibly thirty-six
percent, 78 but also for the judiciary to cast a more watchful and supervisory eye
in cases of this nature. Interestingly, in July 2016, the Bureau did in fact propose
regulations designed to prevent customers from falling into traps in high-cost
loans. 79 Lenders have—predictably—argued that the proposed regulations
“would effectively wipe out the industry, hurting their customers.” 80
Another area of predatory practice, if not contracts of adhesion, can be seen
in the issuance of credit cards. In order to comprehend the conditions imposed
upon the holders of credit cards, the reader must have, at minimum, an eleventhgrade reading level. 81 Yet, half of American adults have only a ninth-grade level
or below reading skill. 82
Complicating credit card issuance further, is the fact that those contracts have
nearly 5,000 words. 83 Consequently, many applicants for a credit card merely

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. Despite a prohibition on payday loans, as well as on all loans on amoun ts of money
under $250,000.00 carrying an interest rate above 16%, in the State of New York, online payday
loans have nonetheless been made, forcing a new investigation by the Attorney General into the
industry itself and the marketers participating in it. See New York Expands Payday Lending
Industry
Investigation
to
Focus
on
Marketers,
KLEIN MOYNIHAN T URCO,
http://www.kleinmoynihan.com/new-york-expands-payday-lending-industry-investigation-tofocus-on-marketers/ (last visited February 19, 2017).
78. See Oppenheimer, supra note 72.
79. Payday, Vehicle T itle, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 47864-01
(July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 1041).
80. Joseph Lawler, Professor brings another take on payday lending, W ASH . EXAMINER, Jan.
16, 2017, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/professor-brings-another-take-on-paydaylending/
article/2611612; see also LISA SERVON , T HE UNBANKING OF AMERICA : HOW THE NEW MIDDLE
CLASS SURVIVES 79 (2017) (suggesting that because 20% of Americans are “ underbanked” and
surely, have no bank account, payday loans can be readily obtained more expeditiously than
processed through large retail banks).
81. Study: Credit Card Agreements Unreadable to Most Americans, CREDITCARDS.COM,
http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/unreadable-card-agreements-study.php (last updated
Sept. 16, 2016).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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“skim through” the provisions of the contract itself. 84 In fact, it is estimated that
75% of Americans do not even read contracts for their credit card. 85 Regrettably,
financial illiteracy is significant and widespread among the general population. 86
D. Opportunities for Quick Cash
A CBS television news report on April 20, 2016, by journalist Anna Werner,
presented a sad report on the life of thirty-one year old Crystal Linton of
Baltimore, Maryland—a functional illiterate suffering from irreparable brain
damage who was not protected sufficiently by the legal system in managing a
structured settlement of $630,000.00 that she received from lead poisoning she
suffered at age three. 87 As a consequence of an action, Crystal and her family
recovered damages from two landlords for the poisoning and a structured
settlement was executed. 88 Under the provisions of the settlement, Crystal was
guaranteed monthly payments for forty years. 89 Subsequently, various loan
companies, including the Stone Street Capital Company in Bethesda, Maryland,
offered Crystal an opportunity to receive “quick cash.”90 Consequently, she
liquidated her “payment stream,” valued at $408,000.00 for the sum of
$66,000.00—with the Stone Street Company being the principal recipient.91
Furthermore, CBS found that some two-dozen other victims of lead poisoning
in Baltimore had made similar deals with other loan companies. 92 The
conclusion to this report found Crystal penniless and almost certainly facing
homelessness. 93
No doubt in very large measure because of this news report by Anna Werner,
in addition to a protracted seven-month investigation, on May 10, 2016, the
Maryland Attorney General announced that the State was bringing suit against
several finance companies for “tricking victims of lead paint poisoning into
signing over the bulk of their settlements in exchange for a one-time cash

84. Jericka Duncan, Reading the Fine Print: Why Credit Card Agreements are so Hard to
Understand, CBS NEWS (Sept. 8, 2016, 7:10 P.M.), http://www.cbsnews.com/n ews/why-credit card-agreements-are-so-hard-to-understand/.
85. Id.
86. Justine S. Hastings, Brigitte C. Madrian & William L. Skimmyhorn, Financial Literacy,
Financial Education and Economic Outcomes, 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 18412, 2012), published in 5 ANN . REV. ECON . 347 (2013).
87. Anna Werner, Lead poisoning victims possibly targeted to sign over settlement funds,
CBS NEWS (April 20, 2016, 7:10 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/lead-poisoning-victim spossibly-targeted-to-sign-over-settlement-money/.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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payment.”94 Simply put, cognitive impairment prevented Crystal Linton and
similarly impaired individuals from understanding what the financial
consequences of their actions would be in selling their structured settlements.
III. EQUIT Y AND CORRECT IVE J UST ICE
Aristotle’s concept of “corrective justice” gave rise to the idea of the rule of
law as the bulwark of democratic societies. 95 Seen as grounded in economics,
this concept of justice is admittedly highly abstract. 96 Corrective Justice “seeks
to redress a preexisting equilibrium” or departure from it, “caused by the
wrongful act.”97 Accordingly, the Aristotelian argument asserts that when
“wrongful behavior . . . disturbs the preexisting balance of wealth or other
advantages between” two parties—with one sustaining injury because of this
behavior, the injured party “is entitled to some form of redress that will, to the
extent feasible, restores that preexisting balance . . . .”98 Determining not only
when behavior is, thus, unreasonable and injurious, as well as assessing factors
necessary to sustain a point of equilibrium in the required balancing is
problematic. While the Restatement of Torts’ model construct for determining
when conduct is unreasonable and actionable under the tort of nuisance is
significant, 99 the law of equity fortifies the efficacy and strength of the
Restatement.
Although equity, in its original jurisdiction, protected “only property rights or
rights of substance in the nature of property rights and [did] not protect personal
or individual rights,”100 the modern trend extends equitable relief to protect those
rights termed “personal” and recognized as such by the judiciary. 101 Put simply,
then, equity is understood popularly as signifying “natural justice or whatever is
right and just as between man and man . . . .”102
Some fifteen maxims, although not recognized as binding rules, are seen as
principles underlying various specific rules. 103 Three particular maxims would
surely be in play when cases of predatory lending, for example, arise: “Equity
will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy[;]”104 “He who comes to Equity

94. Anna Werner, Maryland A.G. Says Company Targeted Lead Poisoning Victims, CBS
NEWS, (May 10, 2016, 7:04 P.M.) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/maryland-attorney-generalsues-finance-company-accused-of-targeting-lead-poisoning-victims/.
95. See P OSNER, supra note 14, at 338.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF T ORTS § 821B (AM. LAW I NST. 1979).
100. W ILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK , HANDBOOK ON MODERN EQUITY 10 (2d ed. 1956).
101. Id. at 124.
102. Id. at 1.
103. RICHARD EDWARDS & NIGEL STOCKWELL , T RUSTS AND EQUITY 34–48 (7th ed. 2005).
104. Id. at 42.

2018]Re-Evaluating the Demise of the Average, Ordinary, Reasonable Person 711

must come with clean hands[;]”105 and, “Equity delights to do justice and not by
halves[.]”106
A.

The United States Supreme Court’s Position

In a key case in the U.S. Supreme Court in 1999, Grupo Mexicano De
Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 107 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued
forcefully that modern equity should be analyzed and viewed expansively in
order to ensure that justice is done when disputations between parties arise. 108
The “Founders,” she said, “adopted equitable principles rather than equitable
practices, leaving room for evolution and expansion of equitable remedies.”109
Justice Scalia, however, expressed a cautionary view that unbounded dangers of
equity existed if this expansive position were to be adopted. 110 For him, it
remained for Congress to expand, if necessary, the jurisdictional base of equity,
thereby responding to changed circumstances. 111
It is argued for the cognitively impaired that the courts should exercise
equitable supervisory powers in order to protect them from unfair and unjust
conduct by those who deal with them. These powers can be seen as emanating
from the very notion of social contract.
B.

Judicial Paternalism or Equitable Supervision

The notion of a social contract existing between the citizen and the
government was envisioned by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in 1762 in France and
adopted subsequently by the American Constitutional Convention. 112 As such,
the contract was viewed as the very foundation for legitimizing and for
governing the common good. 113 Citizen protection was then, and is today, the

105. Id. at 43.
106. See HANBURY & MARTIN : MODERN EQUITY (Jamie Glister & James Lee eds., 20th ed.
2015).
107. 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
108. Id. at 336 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting in part).
109. James Fullmer, The Outer Limits of Equity: A Proposal for Cautious Expansion, 39
HARV. J. L. & P UB. P OL ’ Y 557, 558 (2016) (cit ing Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, 527 U.S. at
336).
110. Grupo Mexicano De Desarollo, 527 U.S. at 332.
111. Fullmer, supra note 109, at 558–59, 566 (suggesting that three types of remedies be
recognized: legal, core equity, and peripheral equity); José Brutau, Juridical Evolution and Equity,
in ESSAYS IN JURISP RUDENCE , supra note 2, at 82. But see Fullmer, supra note 109, at 560–61,
566 (looking to Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015) as evidence of a progressive
expansionist “equitable mood”—termed “peripheral” by the author).
112. See generally ALFRED COBBAN , ROUSSEAU AND THE MODERN STATE (1964) (providing
a history of Rousseau’s theories).
113. See generally George P. Smith, II & Richard P. Gallena, Re-Negotiating A Theory of
Social Contract for Universal Health Care in America or, Securing the Regulatory State? , 63
CATH . U. L. REV. 423, 431 (2014).
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goal of the contract. 114 The supervision and enforcement of “[f]air terms of cooperation” are essential to the effective success of the theory and the ideal of an
enforceable social contract. 115 Implementation of this also requires “an
informed and strategically focused citizenry.”116
Inasmuch as it has been shown in this Article that cognitive impairment is
now commonplace among Americans, 117 and, as a direct consequence of this,
the average, ordinary reasonable person is no longer just moribund, but is
actually dead, 118 a strong argument is to be made that the judiciary has an
important role to play in securing the integrity of the notion of an enforceable
social contract. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the judiciary to promote the
efficient administration of justice by construing challenges and conflicts which
arise—and specifically with cases of predatory lending 119 and contracts of
adhesion120 by fully exercising their equitable powers to protect the cognitively
impaired. The well-established equitable remedy of reformation should be an
important tool here, for, it seeks to correct a defective contract that does not
reflect accurately the parties’ understanding of the contractual terms and ensures
fairness. 121
Courts should seek to act in the best (business-economic) interest of
cognitively deficient parties. 122 Substantive judgments should be made
judicially, based upon what is the fairest economical position for the injured
party—a judgment that, in essence, would have been made initially when
entering into a contractual relationship or other legal relationship if the party did
not have diminished cognitive capacity. 123 These judicial “interferences” are
justified in order to manage and protect against economic harm or negative
externalities, both at the micro and the macro levels of society.

114. Id. at 424–25, 432.
115. Id. at 432.
116. Id. at n.53.
117. See supra notes 16, 61–65, 84–85.
118. See generally MORAN , supra note 4, at 16, 315 (claiming that radical changes in the
concept of what is reasonable is required for there to be an objective standard).
119. See supra Section II.C.
120. T odd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction , 96 HARV. L. REV.
1173, 1177 (1983) (outlining seven characteristics defining a contract of adhesion). T he bulk of
contracts executed in the United States are adhesive; see 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27A (rev.
ed. 2018).
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF CONTRACTS § 155 (AM. LAW I NST. 1981). See also 5
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.18 (2017); T homas E. Baynes, Jr., More Than You Wanted to Know
About the Doctrine of Reformation, 78 FLA . BAR. J. 55, 58 (Oct. 2004).
122. GOSTIN & W ILEY , supra note 19, at 49–50.
123. Id. Interestingly, both the best interests and the substituted judgment constructs are used
extensively in bioethical and healthcare decision-making cases. JANET DOLGIN & LOIS L.
SHEP HERD , BIOETHICS & THE LAW 72–74 (2015).
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C.

The Role of Parens Patriae

Although based originally on the state’s right of guardianship of common
resources, the doctrine of parens patriae has extended the very scope of
sovereign interest to the general welfare of its citizens to act paternally. 124
Despite cognitive impairments, daily life decisions must, nonetheless, be
made. 125 In order to make informed decisions, however, information sources—
business, economic, scientific—must be utilized by the average citizen. Without
knowledge or cognitive capacity (e.g., intelligence) sufficient to access and
process full and accurate information, about costs and benefits of their decisions,
actions may be taken which run counter to the best economic and social interest
of these decisionmakers. 126 Consequently, “[p]ersons who have insufficient
understanding to make informed choices, to deliberate, and to act according to
their . . . plans have diminished autonomy,”127 and must—to the extent
practical—be protected by the judicial system.
It is fully consistent with the states’ parens patriae powers that it seeks to
protect incompetent or economically at-risk persons who are unable to care for
themselves in the marketplace. 128 These powers are shaped, often in
“individualized context.”129 It remains for the state, then—in exercising these
powers—to act beneficently, and “to safeguard the general community interest
in health, welfare, and economic benefit.”130
The need for a positive judicial stance here is all the more important given the
reality that a legislative response through amendment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is not achievable presently. 131 This law, and other similar pieces of
legislatively enacted safeguards have attempted—with varying degrees of

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Curtis, supra note 26, at 908.
GOSTIN & W ILEY , supra note 19, at 51.
Id.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 95–98. See generally SARAH CONLY , AGAINST AUTONOMY : JUSTIFYING
COERCIVE P ATERNALISM (2013) (arguing that state interference in individual autonomy should be
the ideal standard).
129. GOSTIN & W ILEY , supra note 19, at 96.
130. Id. at 98. While liberal principles of pluralism stress the need for government to remain
neutral and allow individuals the autonomous freedom to establish their own life priorities, there is
also a recognition that those “ with intellectual disabilities” may have diminished levels of
intellectual capacity to govern their own affairs, thereby bringing into play their competency to
make rational decisions, especially in the market place. It is argued that “decisions about
competency need to be made, whenever possible, through a formal legal process characterized by
impartiality and fundamental fairness.” Id. at 45.
131. See generally T ed Barrett, Congress is Back, and Here’s What’s on the Agenda , CNN
(Jan. 2, 2018, 12:31 P.M.), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/02/politics/congress-republicans-2018agenda-return/index.html (discussing the 2018 congressional agenda, but not naming civil rights as
a priority). T he Civil Rights Act of 1964 protected “race, co lor, religion, sex [and] national origin.”
T itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 241 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e17 (2012)).
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success—to rid the country of various forms of discrimination, thereby allowing
all citizens equal opportunities regardless of specific limiting conditions. 132
The protective classes within Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act133 were
established to “achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an indefinable group of white
employees over other employees.”134 Presently, Congress has expanded the
original four protected classes in the 1964 Act to include twelve protected
classes. 135
D. Judicial Validation of the Ethics of Efficiency
Sensible judicial decision-making owes its success to what may be termed,
“an intuitive sense of justice.”136 While this approach has led to “sensible results
. . . there has been no similar pressure [for the judiciary] to produce sensible
explanations.”137 Judges must guard against “subtle distortions of prejudice and
bias.”138 Legal disputes are resolved judicially by reference to “normative
standards that enjoy sufficient resonance in the communities in which they are
binding.”139 Whether denominated as “legal doctrine” or based upon an
“educated situation-sense,” their legitimacy and viability depend upon more than
recognition that legal doctrine licenses or validates them. 140
Although economic norms—and particularly those of efficiency—are
properly viewed as foundational vectors of force in both capitalistic democracies
and societies, judicial “sensitivity to political and social norms” has also played
a significant role in judicial decision-making. 141 Indeed, the judicial mind is
132. See Rotunda, supra note 20, at 923–28; see also Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Supreme
Court Chipping Away at Title VII: Strengthening It or Killing It? , 74 LA . L. REV. 1161, 1161–62
(2014).
133. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 241 Pub. L. No. 88 -352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e17 (2012)).
134. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 –30 (1971) (“ If an employment practice
which operates to exclude [African-Americans] cannot be shown to be related to job performance,
the practice is prohibited”). When considering a suit regarding protected classes, the party bringing
the suit has the burden of proving a discriminatory intent or motive. See Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & T r., 487 U.S. 977, 986. (1988). In facilitating this requirement, the Supreme Court devised
a burden-shifting framework. T ex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255–56
(1981).
135. T he twelve protected classes are: (1) Race, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); (2) Color, id.; (3)
Religion, id.; (4) National Origin, id.; (5) Sex, id.; (6) Pregnancy, id.; see also § 2000e (including
pregnancy in the definition of “ because of sex” or “ on the basis of sex”); (7) Familial Status, §
3605(a); (8) Disability, § 12112; (9) Genetic Information, § 2000ff -1; (10) Age, 29 U.S.C. §
623(e)(2); (11) Citizenship, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b; and (12) Veteran Status, 38 U.S.C. § 4311.
136. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK , T HE DEATH OF THE I RREP ARABLE I NJURY RULE ix (1991).
137. Id.
138. JOHN RAWLS, A T HEORY OF JUSTICE 207 (rev. ed.1999).
139. Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Doctrine, 163 U. P A . L. REV. 1975, 1983 (2015).
140. Id.
141. Id. For a collection of empirical studies exploring economic factors in judicial decision -
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enriched not only by “emotion,” but by “temperament,” “experience,” and
“background” together with “ideology” and an “objective understanding” of the
law of the case. 142
In crafting their judicial decisions, it is important for judges to be “realistic”
and practical in their analysis. 143 The primary need remains to write a sensible
opinion which would allow an “intelligent” layperson to review it as being
correct. 144 To that end, exhibiting “common sense” goes far to make sound
law. 145 Reasoned or reflective judgments are far better than making decision
grounded in personal judgment. 146
For Benjamin Cardozo, finding a “just decision” or “solution” is pivotal to
sound judicial decision-making. 147 The judicial responsibilities of the judiciary,
then, are very much the same as they have been over the years: namely, to craft
decisions which are drawn from common sense, and thus reflect “sensible
results[;]” decisions which are reasoned carefully and are reflective; and
decisions which are “just.” Judicial philosophies should be clear and unambiguous and not seen as “mysteries.”148
In a contemporary society where capitalism is the cornerstone, it is incumbent
upon the judiciary to protect and sustain economic liberties. Indeed, this very
ideal is central to the Federal Constitution and its interpretation. 149 Furthermore,
this notion is fortified when it is realized that the core of every legal case tests
the propriety, or reasonableness, of the parties’ conduct. In reaching a decision
on this very issue, then it is submitted that the courts should use the template
suggested in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Nuisance, for determining the

making, see LEE EP STEIN , W ILLIAM M. LANDES, & RICHARD A. P OSNER, T HE BEHAVIOR OF
FEDERAL JUDGES: A T HEORETICAL AND EMP IRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013).
142. RICHARD A. P OSNER, HOW JUDGES T HINK 174 (2008). Nine theories of judicial behavior
are said to be: attitudinal; strategic; sociological; psychological; economic; organization;
pragmatic; phenomenological; and legalistic. Id. at 19.
143. See RICHARD A. P OSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 167–68 (2013).
144. See id. at 268.
145. Peak v. United States, 353 U.S. 43, 46 (1957).
146. See John Dewey, Logical Method in Law, 10 CORN . L. REV. 17, 24 (1924).
147. Robert John Araujo, Justice As Right Relationship: A Philosophical and Theological
Reflection on Affirmative Action, 27 P EP P . L. REV. 377, 404 (2000). Cardozo listed four methods
which could be used in determining the “ justest” and “ rightest” decision: the logical or
philosophical method; a consideration of historical antecedents relevant to the instant case;
reference to prevailing social usages and customs; and sociological analysis of the face of a case.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO , T HE NATURE OF T HE JUDICIAL P ROCESS 30–31 (1921).
148. Edwin W. Patterson, reviewing Julius Stone, T HE P ROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW :
LAW AS LOGIC, JUSTICE , AND SOCIAL CONTROL (1946), 47 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 331 (1947).
See generally Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 T EX. L. REV. 257–58 (2015).
149. See GOSTIN & W ILEY , supra note 19, at 473 (“ T he Framers intended to defend economic
freedoms, as evidenced by several constitutional provisions. Notably, the Constitution prevents the
state from depriving persons of property (or life or liberty) without due process of law (economic
due process), from impairing the obligations of contracts (freedom of contract), and from taking
private property for public use without just compensation (“ takings”).”) (footnotes omitted).
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reasonableness of conduct. 150 The cost/benefit construct of the Restatement
fortifies the economic ethic and rationale of efficiency which should be the
standard used in deciding all cases where reasonable conduct is in issue.
IV. CAUSAT ION: NEMESIS OF T HE T ORT OF NEGLIGENCE
Most areas of law use reasonableness as either a “yardstick” for measuring
conduct or understand it as an “overreaching legal concept” and, as such,
“applicable mutatis mutandis.”151 As observed, the fundamental “objective of
tort liability” is the “deterrence of unreasonable risk.”152 Accordingly, the
determination of when risks are unreasonable is central to any fair application
and use of the law of negligence. 153 The “essence of reasonableness” continues
to bedevil the courts, with agreement upon one definition remaining a “logical
impossibility.”154 Normative definitions, which allow for concrete ethical
theories (e.g., consequentialist, deontological, or virtue), are however said to be
preferable to positive definitions of reasonableness. 155 Alternatively, because
the attributes of determining a reasonable character are so “illusory,” it has been
suggested that the whole ideal or notion of determining whether conduct is
reasonable or unreasonable be re-calibrated so that the determinative issue is
whether a particular conduct is grounded in common sense. 156 In testing the
contours of the integrity or rationality of common sense responses, “the quality
of the normative choice that particular interactions reveal” should be
determinative. 157 Consequently, what is taken as “normal” should be accepted,
then, as reasonable. 158
Others maintain a more realistic approach to resolving the quandary of
measuring reasonable conduct is found through the utilization of community
standards as an analogy to the reasonable person. 159 Therefore, courts should
determine whether the questioned conduct reflects “the average conscience of
the time” and, thus, should “be subject[ed] to the social sense of what is right.” 160

150. See generally P OSNER, supra note 143.
151. Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 391–92
(2012); see also ERNEST J. W EINRIB, T HE I DEA OF P RIVATE LAW 147–49 (1995) (discussing
reasonable care).
152. See Miller & Perry, supra note 151, at 328.
153. See id. at 331.
154. Id. at 391.
155. Id.
156. MORAN , supra note 4, at 316; see also, Smith, supra note 17, at 733. Confusing efforts
have been made to distinguish “ practical reasonableness” (classified further as “ instrumental
rationality”) and “ practical reason and practical judgment ” from economic rationality. See
Zipursky, supra note 15, at 2142.
157. MORAN , supra note 4, at 316.
158. Id. at 131.
159. Miller & Perry, supra note 151, at 391–92.
160. United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
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Judge Learned Hand first suggested this approach in 1913, 161 and it was used as
a judicial “formula” for adjudicating obscenity cases, specifically, in defining
when conduct was obscene. 162 Over the years, Judge Hand clarified and refined
his definition of reasonableness for negligence cases in terms of cost/benefit
analysis. 163 Accordingly, Judge Hand’s economic definition “holds that a person
acts unreasonably if he or she takes less than the socially optimal level of
care.”164 Therefore, for those who fail to take “cost-justified precautions,” under
the Hand construct a claim of negligence is proper. 165
Some have modified the Hand Formula so as to include a causation element,
thereby supporting a balancing theory and driving economic efficiencies. 166
Others have criticized these efforts and contended that they essentially sound the

161. See id.
162. Miller & Perry, supra note 151, at 392.
163. Id. at 398. See also Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949); United States v.
Carroll T owing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); Conway v. O’Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d
Cir. 1940); Gunnarson v. Robert Jacob, Inc., 94 F.2d 170, 172 (2d. Cir. 1938). The Hand negligence
calculus was stated as an algebraic equation: “ if the probability [of harm] be called P; the [gravity
of the resulting] injury, L; and the burden [of adequate precautions to avert the harm], B; liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B<PL.” Carroll Towing Co.,
159 F.2d at 173. Although recognizing the traditional notion “ that a weighing of risks and utilities
was necessary[,]” the original formula did not incorporate clearly causation into equation. DAN B.
DOBBS, T HE LAW OF T ORTS § 161 (2d ed. 2018). See generally Keith N. Hylton, Information and
Causation in Tort Law: Generalizing the Learned Ha nd Test for Causation Cases, 7 J. T ORT L. 35,
37 (2014).
164. Miller & Perry, supra note 151, at 328. See also Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173.
T he economic definition of reasonableness is endorsed in the Restatement (Third) of T orts when
provision is made that a negligent act results when an individual fails to exercise “ reasonable care
under all the circumstances.” RESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF T ORTS: P HYS. & EMOT. HARM § 3 (AM.
LAW I NST. 2010). T he three variables in the Hand formula are then listed as t he primary factors to
be evaluated when determining whether “ conduct lacks reasonable care”: namely (1) “the
foreseeable likelihood that the person’s conduct will result in harm[;]” (2) “ the foreseeable severity
of any harm that may ensure[;]” and (3) “ the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk
of harm.” See Miller & Perry, supra note 151, at 389 (quoting RESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF T ORTS:
P HYS. & EMOT. HARM § 3).
165. Miller & Perry, supra note 151, at 328. Interestingly, a classic model of a pattern jury
instruction defining negligence is:
“ Negligence” is the omission to do something which a reasonable person guided by those
considerations which ordinarily influence a person of reasonable prudence would do
under all the circumstances of the situation in question, or the doing of something which
a person of the ordinary reasonable prudence would not do under all the circumstances
of the situation in question.
George P. Smith, II, Effective Instructions to the Federal Jury in a Civil Case: A Consideration in
Microcosm , 18 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 576 (1967) (Appendix A, Model Pattern Jury Instructions).
166. See LANDES & P OSNER, supra note 6, at 234 (advocating for a “refined version of the
Hand formula” with a causation element); see also Zipursky, supra note 15, at 2151 (explaining
Posner’s theory of negligence is the “ classic interpretation of the negligence standard as an
economic version of the Hand Formula”).
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death knell altogether for the Formula. 167 The argument for this stance is that
these economic revisions theories “not only fail to explain the existence and
prominence of the actual causation requirement, but also make it increasingly
clear that the requirement is—as first suggested by Calabresi—incompatible
with wealth maximization.”168
Previously, as early as 1980, the Formula was seen as focused narrowly on a
single claim in court, rather than as analyzing the defendant’s actions in the
aggregate. 169 Arguing in 2015 that “the Hand formula grossly misrepresents
what ‘negligence’ really is,”170 Zipursky asserts that the Formula has lost
relevance because of its failure to recognize the “moral principle that each of us
owes a duty of ordinary care to others, and that liability in negligence is premised
on a failure to live up to that duty.”171
Failing to meet a standard of reasonable care is the gravamen of the tort of
negligence. 172 Consequently, when a party creates a risk which a reasonable
person would not impose upon others, the standard of reasonable care is
breached. 173 “Presupposed is the existence of a certain level of risk to which the
defendant can expose the plaintiff without committing a wrong, even if injury
should result.”174 Liability, therefore, is imposed upon a defendant only when
injuries materialize from risk conduct which exceeds that level. 175 Under the
Common Law, a determination is made on a case-by-case basis as to the
acceptability of risk. 176 The American position utilizes a comparison of the risk
with precautionary costs necessary to prevent it. Interestingly, the English and
Commonwealth position is to disregard the costs of prevention altogether in
167. See generally Richard W. Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane
of Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD . 435, 438–55 (1985) (criticizing economic theories of
analyses, such as those suggested by Calabasi, Shavel, Landes, and Posner).
168. Id. at 439.
169. Rodgers, supra note 5, at 9 (explaining that the “[s]ingle case applications of the Hand
Formula understate the social costs of the private investment decision by overlooking all other
accidents that could be avoided by the same safety expenditures”). Several years later, Landes and
Posner sought to refute this point writing specifically, “ [t]he first of those factors is the probability
of not injuring a particular person but any person . . . . T his point is overlooked in the attack on the
economic approach to negligence . . . .” LANDES & P OSNER, supra note 6, at 151 n.6.
170. Zipursky, supra note 15, at 2134.
171. Id. at 2169.
172. W EINRIB, supra, note 151, at 147. The traditional test for determining whether the tort of
negligence has been committed is tied to the reasonable person test. Accordingly, negligence
occurs whether action is undertaken, which under the circumstances, a reasonable per son would
not have undertaken; or, “ from failing to do an act that a reasonable person would do.” Miller &
Perry, supra note 151, at 325.
173. W EINRIB, supra, note 151, at 147. Seen as a “ decision-guiding device” for judges and
jurors alike, the reasonable person test allows these decision makers “ to make reasonableness
determinations where necessary.” Zipursky, supra note 15, at 2149.
174. W EINRIB, supra, note 151, at 147.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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determining whether negligence has been committed. 177 Focus, instead, is
placed upon determining whether a defendant has met its responsibility to meet
a standard of care which is owed to a putative plaintiff. 178
The concept of proximate cause, as seen, is fraught with ambiguity and
difficulty in articulating this essentially because the term seeks to convey those
legal circumstances where it is fair to impose liability for negligent
wrongdoing. 179 Under any and all tests of proximate cause, the underlying
purpose is the same: namely, “to limit the defendant’s liability for policy
reasons . . . .”180 Accordingly, the judiciary has considerable “leeway to dismiss
lawsuits in cases where the judge is simply not comfortable with the idea of
assigning blame to the defendant.”181 Yet, when an economic analysis of tort
law is followed, the very notion of causation can be dispensed with largely. 182
The reason for this is that since both plaintiff and defendant may have taken
precautions in order to avoid conflict, the central task is more properly not to
determine whether a defendant caused an injury to the plaintiff, but rather which
of the parties—acting more “cheaply” or economically—could have avoided the
accident altogether. 183
V. NUISANCE LAW AND T HE REST AT EMENT OF T ORT S: UNINT ENDED
CONSEQUENCES AND NEW PROSPECT S FOR T HE EFFICIENT ADMINIST RAT ION
OF J UST ICE
Even though termed an “impenetrable jungle,”184 the Common Law tort of
nuisance must surely be recognized, at a minimum, as ubiquitous. 185 It is
through the very ubiquity of the Common Law that the law of nuisance has
shown its “historical capacity to adapt to . . . changing conditions . . . .”186 By
statute, California finds:

177. Id. at 147–48.
178. Id. at 148. “ [H]arm is universally regarded as the [proximate cause] . . . of the actor’s
negligence.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF T ORTS § 435, cmt. b (AM. LAW I NST. 1965).
179. See GOSTIN & W ILEY , supra note 19, at 247. See also LANDES & P OSNER, supra note 6,
at Ch. 8.
180. GOSTIN & W ILEY , supra, note 19, at 251.
181. Id. See generally, H. L. A. HART & T ONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959).
182. LANDES & P OSNER, supra note 6, at 229. See also W EINRIB, supra note 172, at 47–48.
183. Id.
184. W ILLIAM L. P ROSSER, T HE LAW OF T ORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971).
185. See generally Smith, supra note 17.
186. George P. Smith, II & David M. Steenburg, Environmental Hedonism Or, Securing The
Environment Through The Common Law, 40 W M. & MARY ENVTL . L. & P OL ’Y REV. 65, 106
(2015).
Public nuisance has been described as a “ super tort”—this, because both the standards of
fault and of causation are more pliable and, thus, are applied less rigorously than with claims of
traditional negligence. When used by governments as plaintiffs, the remedy of nuisance is a form
of strict no-fault liability. See GOSTIN & W ILEY , supra note 19, at 245–46.

720

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 67:699

Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the
illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the
senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere
with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully
obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any
navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public
park, square, street, or highway is a nuisance. 187
Stated more succinctly, an unreasonable interference with the use or
enjoyment of real property is a nuisance. 188 In the law of nuisance, only when
actions are shown to be unreasonable—rather than intentional—may, under the
facts, they be classified as nuisance. 189 Concern is not given to “the riskiness of
the defendant’s conduct,” but, rather, whether the defendant’s conduct was an
“interference with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff’s land.” 190
In determining when unreasonable conduct gives rise to legal liability, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Nuisance, Sections 822, 827, and 828 presents a
template—if not a workable construct—for assessing the extent to which
behavioral norms and economic value factors have been so compromised as to
create a legal injury. The Restatement factors, or vectors of force, provide a
framework which, in turn, allows the judiciary to test the extent to which the
parameters of legally acceptable (e.g., reasonable) conduct has been
compromised. 191
Section 822 of the Restatement of Tort, Nuisance, provides:
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his
conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another’s interest in the
private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either
(a) intentional and unreasonable, or
(b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling
liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous
conditions or activities. 192
In determining the gravity of the harm and the social value of activity
allegedly causing injury, Sections 827 and 828 of the statement list a number of
factors to be considered as:
(a) The extent of the harm involved;
(b) the character of the harm involved;
187. Cal. Civil Code § 3479 (2012).
188. LANDES & P OSNER, supra note 6, at 42. See Wietzke v. Chesapeake Conf. Ass’n, 26
A.3d 931, 939 (Md. 2011) (defining an interference as on e which exceeds what a reasonable person
can be expected to tolerate).
189. LANDES & P OSNER, supra note 6, at 49.
190. W EINRIB, supra note 151, at 190. See generally Smith, supra note 17.
191. RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF T ORTS, §§ 822, 827, and 828 (AM. LAW I NST. 1979).
192. Id. § 822. See DAN B. DOBBS, P AUL T . HAYDEN , & ELLEN M. BUBLICK , HANDBOOK ON
T ORTS, Ch. 30, § 30.6 (2d ed. 2016).
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(c) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment
invaded;
(d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the
character of the locality; and
(e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm. 193
The “Utility of Conduct” balancing factors are listed in Section 828 as:
(a) the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the
conduct;
(b) the suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality; and
(c) the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion. 194
What is seen in Sections 827 and 828 of the Restatement, therefore, is nothing
more than cost/benefit analysis of quintessential, or reasonable, conduct. The
advantage of the Restatement’s position here is that rather than being tethered to
positive definitions of reasonableness as seen with caution in the tort of
negligence, which are “logically unacceptable[,]”195 the Restatement seeks to
determine, and thereby codify, the reasonable bounds of normative conduct (i.e.,
legally acceptable conduct) by enumerating specific behavioral and economic
factors to test when challenged conduct is not cost-effective and thus
unreasonable. 196
Interestingly, with terms such as “balancing the equities,” “comparative
hardship,” “relative hardship,” and “the balance of consensus,” most state courts
evaluate requests for injunctive relief for nuisance as some form of balancing
mechanism. 197
A. Challenging the Balancing Test
No doubt, the two major obstacles to the integrity of the balancing test for the
Restatement are consistency and clarity—this, because, admittedly, there is no
assurance, even theoretically, that like cases will be treated similarly.
Subsequently, the effect of this reality is that uncertainty and lack of
predictability exist regarding what standard of behavior is allowed and what is
disallowed. 198 Yet, in considering nuisance law and the principal remedy of
equitable relief through use of the injunction, the balancing test should be seen
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) T ORTS § 822 (AM LAW I NST. 1979).
194. Id. § 828.
195. Miller & Perry, supra note 151, at 391.
196. T he three options t o the Restatement of T orts position are: making a determination under
English Common Law that a defendant ’s conduct caused or threatened an invasion of land owned
by a plaintiff; applying a community understanding of what is normal or abnormal uses of land;
and, whether the complaining parties acted within the norms of “ neighborliness” of the community
in which they live. See Smith & Steenburg, supra note 186, at 105 (citing T HOMAS W. MERRILL
& HENRY E. SMITH , P ROP ERTY : P RINCIP LES AND P OLICIES 28–29 (2d ed. 2012)).
197. Jeff L. Lewin, The Silent Revolution in West Virginia’s Law of Nuisance, 92 W. VA . L.
REV. 235, 304 (1990).
198. Smith, supra note 17, at 720.
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as a positive—if not dominant strength—because of the modernizing values and
vectors of force it exhibits by incorporating these contemporary social values
into the test, itself. 199
B.

Fortifying the Restatement through the Common Law

The whole of the Common Law can be seen properly as both sustaining and
fortifying the Restatement’s position on nuisance, for it is through the Common
Law, and its capacity to adapt to the changing conditions of social conduct, that
the most efficacious test of reasonableness can be found. 200 Indeed, this capacity
for adapting to the changing condition of each community, and the views and
understanding of the communities regarding what “normal land use” include,
and the extent to which they are violated by unreasonable conduct, are central to
the over-arching power of the Common Law. 201 The weight of the Restatement
balancing factors for determining whether conduct is reasonable or tortious (i.e.,
unreasonable) varies, then, within each community and with the community’s
progress or failure to integrate public civil values into new and signific ant
factors. 202
Adding to the guidance of the Common Law as a real and animated direction
and force today are three important realities: the doctrine of waste, 203 the
principle of “Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,”204 and the acceptance that the
Common Law is best viewed properly “as a system promoting economic
efficiency.”205 Resource use is, ideally, guided by five values: economic
efficiency; human flourishing; interpretational and future population groups;
stability and consistency; and ecological balance. 206 Ideally, any metric for
determining when a resource use is unreasonable and wasteful should therefore
balance these values or vectors of force. This Article argues that economic
efficiency should be pivotal to any determination of when a use—under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts—is unreasonable, be it a nuisance or any other
civil wrong.

199.
200.

Id.
ZYGMUNT J.B. P LATER ET AL ., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & P OLICY : NATURE LAW AND
SOCIETY 57 (4th ed. 2010).
201. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as
Land Use Controls, 40 CHI. L. REV. 681, 729–33 (1973). See also Smith & Steenburg, supra note
186, at 106.
202. P LATER ET AL ., supra note 200, at 57.
203. Michael Pappas, Anti-Waste, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 741, 751, 756, 764 (2014). See also Smith,
supra note 17, at 696 n.262.
204. Id. at 680.
205. P OSNER, supra note 14, at 342. See also Elliot, supra note 41, at 71.
206. Pappas, supra note 203, at 741. See generally George P. Smith, II & Griffin W.
Fernandez, The Price of Beauty: An Economic Approach to Aesthetic Nuisance, 15 HARV. ENVT’ L
L. REV. 53 (1991).
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The sic utere principle mandates that the use of real property not be injurious
to others. 207 Although seemingly open-ended, this principle lays the predicate
for the Restatement’s balancing factors and thus “fleshes out” the action which
result in unreasonable conduct. 208 As argued, these balancing factors, in turn,
provide a template for decision-making for all levels of the law and just not the
tort of nuisance.
Accepting the fact that the Common Law promotes economic efficiency209
establishes the efficacy of the notion that members of contemporary capitalistic
society should seek to maximize their wealth by acting in a rational, efficient
manner. This assumption, it is submitted, should be the controlling philosophy
for the judiciary when challenges are made that conduct is not in conformance
with this standard and is inefficient, unreasonable, and, thus, injurious.
Reasonableness of conduct becomes the focal point of any judicial inquiry. The
construct or template for proving this conduct is, then, to be found, as seen,
within the cost/benefit balancing interests set out by the Restatement of Torts,
Nuisance.
VI. PLEADING IN T HE ALT ERNAT IVE : A PARADIGM
CLARIFICAT ION?

OF CONFUSION OR

The goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—through liberal
construction of judicial pleadings—is to promote the efficient and expeditious
administration of justice. 210 A final judgment “must grant all relief to which a
plaintiff is entitled, whether or not demanded in the pleadings.”211 Specific
authorization is granted under Rule 8(d) for a statement of as many claims or
defenses deemed necessary regardless of this characterization as legal, equitable,
or maritime. 212
Alternative or hypothetical allegations, even if inconsistent, are allowed. 213
Accordingly, the pleader is neither required to elect among allegations put
forward nor to elect remedies for relief. 214 It is the responsibility of the trier of
fact to consider both plaintiff’s claims and the defenses raised. 215 The Federal
Rules require only that the defendant be given “a short and plain statement of
the claim” which provides fair notice of the claims and grounds being put
forward by a plaintiff. 216
207.
208.
209.
210.
2012).
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Smith & Steenburg, supra note 186, at 69.
Smith, supra note 17, at 698.
Id. See also Smith & Steenburg, supra note 186, at 68–69.
CHARLES ALAN W RIGHT & MARY KAY KANE , LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 467 (7th ed.
Id. at 466.
Id.
Id. at 470.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 468.
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A case study of Cline v. Dunlora South, LLC217 serves to illustrate both the
positive and the negative consequences of pleading a nuisance action and one in
negligence alternatively.
A.

Cline v. Dunlora South, LLC: The Facts

The facts in Cline are straightforward. Dr. Matthew W. Cline was driving
home from his dental practice on the evening of April 17, 2008, near the seven
hundred block of Rio Road East, in Albemarle County, Virginia. 218 According
to a Virginia Department of Transportation Daily Traffic Volume Estimate,
twenty-five thousand vehicles drove on this portion of Rio Road East. 219 One
parcel of property adjacent to Rio Road East near its intersection with Pen Park
Drive was “owned and/or controlled, inspected, maintained and/or serviced” by
Dunlora South, LLC (“Dunlora”). 220 As Dr. Cline drove his 1997 Ford Explorer
home a large, dead or rotting, tree, approximately twenty-five inches in
diameter, fell from the parcel of land owned by Dunlora onto the roof,
windshield, and hood of his vehicle. 221 Dr. Cline suffered severe and permanent
injuries from the accident, including fractures of his cervical spine. 222
In modern tort law, many of the claims involving dead or rotting trees, such
as the case in Cline, concern negligence and/or nuisance law. 223 Virginia Courts

217. 726 S.E.2d 14, 15–16 (Va. 2012).
218. Opening Brief of Appellant at 6, Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14 (Va. 2012) (No.
110650), 2012 WL 6734517, at *5.
219. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 15.
220. Opening Brief of Appellant at 6, Cline, 726 S.E.2d 14 (No. 110650).
221. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 15; Opening Brief of Appellant at 6, Cline, 726 S.E.2d 14 (No.
110650).
222. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 15.
223. Daniel Bidwell, Of Trees, Vegetation, and Torts: Re-Conceptualizing Reasonable Land
Use, 62 CATH . U. L. REV. 1035, 1036 (2014); see George P. Smith, II, Re-validating the Doctrine
of Anticipatory Nuisance, 29 VT. L. REV. 687, 687 (2005); Glenn A. McCleary, The Possessor’s
Responsibilities As to Trees, 29 MO . L. REV. 159, 173 (1964); Lane v. W.J. Curry & Sons, 92
S.W.3d 355 (T enn. 2002) (discussing recent case law concerning tree-related harms in more urban
settings); e.g., T ownes at Grand Oaks T ownhouse Ass’n, Inc. v. Baxter, 86 Va. Cir. 449 (Va. Cir.
Ct. 2013) (finding no liability to a condominium owner in the absence of negligence of the
homeowner association); Stackhouse v. Royce Realty & Mgmt. Corp., 970 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Il.
App. 2012) (finding defendants property owner and management corporation equally responsible
in negligence when a rotted tree fell and injured a pedestrian); T aylor v. Olsen, 578 P.2d 779, 784
(Or. 1978) (finding no negligence on the part of a property owner when the rot of the center of the
tree was not visible upon external inspection before the tree fell in a roadway, causing an accident);
Hensley v. Montgomery Cty., 334 A.2d 542, 545 (Md. App. 1 975) (finding no duty by the property
owner or the county responsible for the road in a negligence claim when a tree limb from a dead
tree fell through plaintiff’s windshield as he was driving). See also RESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF
T ORTS: P HYS. & EMOT. HARM § 8 (AM. LAW I NST. 2010) (“ An actor whose wrongful conduct
harms or obstructs a public resource or public property is subject to liability for resulting economic
loss if the claimant ’s losses are distinct in kind from those suffered by members of the affected
community in general.”).
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first addressed claims concerning dead or rotting trees in 1939. 224 In Smith v.
Holt, the Supreme Court of Virginia established the Virginia Rule, which creates
a nuisance cause of action for an adjoining landowner if “a sensible injury has
been inflicted by the protrusion of roots from a noxious tree or plant onto [his
land.]”225 This duty follows the common law maximum “sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas—one must so use his own rights as not to infringe upon the
rights of another.”226 Then, in Fancer v. Fagella the Virginia Supreme Court
reexamined the Virginia Rule of negligence, 227 and instead decided to adopt a
rule similar to the Virginia Rule, called the Hawaii Rule. 228 The Hawaii
approach finds that “[e]ncroaching trees and plants may be regarded as a
nuisance when they cause actual harm or pose an imminent danger of actual
harm to adjoining property . . . .”229 Under the Hawaii approach, a successful
suit must show that a neighbor’s tree encroaching onto his land “cause[s] actual
harm or . . . the imminent danger of actual harm . . . .”230 Comparatively, a
successful negligence claim involves showing four elements: (1) the defendant
owed the plaintiff a duty; (2) the defendant failed to act on that duty; (3) the
plaintiff suffered a harm (damages); and (4) the failure to act on the duty was
the proximate and “but-for” cause of the harm the plaintiff suffered. 231 In treerelated negligence suits, the crux of the case will be whether the owner of a tree
was under a duty not to injure the plaintiff. 232
In February 2010, Dr. Cline filed suit in the Circuit Court for Albemarle
County seeking recovery against several defendants believed to own the land
from which the tree responsible for his injuries fell. 233 The premise of Dr.
Cline’s suit was that an owner of property adjacent to a public highway owes a
duty to care for, inspect, maintain, and/or service a tree abutting the public
highway. 234 All of the defendants demurred, and at an oral hearing in August
2010, Dr. Cline sought a nonsuit as to three of the defendants, leaving Dunlora

224. Bidwell, supra note 223, at 1036 (citing Smith v. Holt, 5 S.E.2d 492 (Va. 1939) overruled
by Fancher v. Fagella, 650 S.E.2d 519 (Va. 2007)).
225. Smith, 5 S.E.2d at 495 overruled by Fancher, 650 S.E.2d at 519.
226. Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14, 19 (Va. 2012) (Lemons, J., dissenting).
227. Fancher, 650 S.E.2d at 521. “ T he ‘Virginia Rule,’ holds that the intrusion of roots and
branches from a neighbor’s plantings which were ‘not noxious in [their] nature’ and had caused ‘no
sensible injury’ were not actionable at law, the plaintiff being limited to his right of self-help.” Id.
(brackets in original).
228. Id. at 522. “ T he ‘Hawaii Rule,’ holds that living trees and plants are ordinarily not
nuisances, but can become so when they cause actual harm or pose an imminent danger of actual
harm to adjoining property.” Id. at 521.
229. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 17 (quoting Francher, 650 S.E.2d at 552).
230. Id. at 19 (Lemons, J., dissenting).
231. Bidwell, supra note 223, at 1038.
232. Id.
233. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 15.
234. Id.
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as the sole defendant. 235 In November 2010, Dr. Cline filed an amended
complaint against Dunlora for the injuries he sustained, asserting that according
to Fancher v. Fagella, and other Virginia case law, Dunlora had a duty to use
reasonable care in the inspection, maintenance, and/or service of trees and other
vegetation on their property, and to remove or make safe such trees, which
presented a hazard to passersby. 236 Dr. Cline further asserted that Dunlora’s
ownership and maintenance of the property and the “dying, dead, and/or rotten
tree” was a danger to passersby and constituted a nuisance. 237 Although theories
of public nuisance238 in Virginia protected against this type of obstruction, 239
Dr. Cline’s nuisance claim did not receive as much attention as his negligence
claim. 240 Dunlora filed another demurrer, which the Circuit Court of Albemarle
County sustained without leave to amend, holding that Virginia law does not
provide any authority for an award of personal injury damages caused by a tree
235. Id.; Opening Brief of Appellant at 4, Cline, 726 S.E.2d 14 (No. 110650).
236. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 15–16; Opening Brief of Appellant at 2, 5, Cline, 726 S.E.2d 14 (No.
110650) (“ [T]raditional Virginia tort law, as well as the trend in other jurisdictions and secondary
authorities, dictate[s] that a landowner has a duty to act reasonably to prevent its trees from injuring
those for whom injury is reasonably foreseeable.”).
237. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 15–16. T he Virginia Supreme Court identified in footnote 1 of its
opinion, “ [Dr.] Cline’s nuisance claim is based upon Dunlora’s alleged conduct” and if Dunlora’s
conduct was not negligent, the nuisance claim correspondingly fails. Id. at 16 n.1. See also DOBBS,
supra note 163, at § 400 (“ So far as a supposed nuisance rests upon proof of the defendant ’s
negligence, the case proceeds largely as would any other negligence case, and the nuisance label
adds little or nothing to the analysis.”).
238. A public nuisance is “ an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF T ORTS § 821B (AM. LAW I NST. 1979); see also Warren A.
Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARV. L. REV. 984, 984–85
(1952) (“ Conduct which interferes solely with the use of a relatively small area of private land . . .
is called a private nuisance. Conduct which interferes with the use of a public place or with the
activities of an entire community is called a public nuisance.”).
239. In relation to public streets, “ [a]ny unauthorized obstruction that unnecessarily impedes
the lawful use of a public street is a public nuisance at common law.” Breeding ex rel. Breeding v.
Hensley, 519 S.E.2d 369, 372 (Va. 1999); see also Price v. T ravis, 140 S.E. 644, 647 (Va. 1927)
(“ [T ]he essential characteristic of a public nuisance is that the thing imperils the safety of a public
highway.”). Professor Prosser considered the obstruction of a public highway the “ obvious
illustration” of a public nuisance. William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA .
L. REV. 997, 1001–02 (1966).
240. Although at the initial stage Dr. Cline pleaded theories of nuisance, see Amended
Complaint, Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 81 Va. Cir. 235 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2010) (No. CL1000012200),
2010 WL 9100619, the Circuit Court of Albemarle County sustained Dunlora’s Demurrer, see
Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, No. CL10000122 -00, 2011 WL 9809654 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 4, 2011),
which stated that Dr. Cline’s “ [a]mended complaint failed to set forth facts sufficient to state a
cause of action for nuisance.” Demurrer to Amended Complaint, Cline, 81 Va. Cir. 245 (No.
CL1000012200). On review the Virginia Supreme Court considered a narrow question: “ does a
Virginia landowner have a duty to take reasonable precautions to prevent foreseeable personal
injury caused by its tree that has been visibly dead and decaying for years?” Opening Brief of
Appellant at 1, Cline, 726 S.E.2d 14 (No. 110650). T he Virginia Supreme Court did not even
consider whether nuisance would have been an alternative to negligence and it is unclear how they
might have decided on this issue. See generally Cline, 726 S.E.2d 14.
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on adjacent land. 241 In 2011, Dr. Cline appealed to the Supreme Court of
Virginia. 242
When Dr. Cline’s case against Dunlora was before the Virginia Supreme
Court in early 2012, the rule followed by the court was the Hawaii rule, which
“gave injured plaintiffs access to legal remedies under the theory that trees could
constitute a nuisance when they caused actual harm or posed the threat of
imminent harm.”243 Therefore, the question before the Supreme Court of
Virginia on appeal was whether a private landowner has a reasonable sic utere
duty to prevent injuries caused by a dead or rotting “tree falling from private
land onto. . . a public highway.”244
1. The Majority Opinion
In a four to three split decision, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the
judgment of the Circuit Court of Albemarle County and entered a final judgment
against Dr. Cline. 245 The Court held that a landowner only owes a duty “to
refrain from engaging in any act that makes the highway more dangerous than
in a state of nature or in the state in which it has been left.”246 Moreover, the
Court opined that it had “never recognized, nor did [its] precedents support, a
ruling that a landowner owes a duty to protect travelers on an adjoining public
roadway from natural conditions on his or her land.”247
In considering the question presented, a de novo standard of review was used,
and the Court accepted as true the factual allegations of Dr. Cline’s complaint,
his attachments, and the reasonable inferences that followed, but not Dr. Cline’s
legal conclusions. 248 The opinion first examined the history of the duties a
landowner owed to those outside the land and whether such duty exists. 249
Initially, the discussion considered common law and found that “a landowner
owed no duty to those outside the land with respect to natural conditions existing
on the land, regardless of their dangerous condition.”250 Then, the Court looked
to its decision in Smith v. Holt, and observed how there was never a standard
fashioned allowing for the application of the “principles of ordinary negligence
[to] apply to natural conditions on land,” but rather had allowed a nuisance cause
of action, “if a sensible injury was inflicted by the protrusion of roots from a
241. Cline, 81 Va. Cir. at 236, aff’d, 726 S.E.2d 14 (Va. 2012); Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, No.
CL10000122-00, 2011 WL 9809654 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 4, 2011).
242. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 15; Opening Brief of Appellant at 5, Cline, 726 S.E.2d 14 (No.
110650).
243. Bidwell, supra note 223, at 1036.
244. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 15.
245. See id. at 15, 18.
246. Id. at 18.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 16.
249. See id. at 16–17.
250. Id. at 16.
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noxious tree or plant on the property of an adjoining landowner.” 251 But, the
Court also recognized that it had adopted the Hawaii approach in Fancher to
encroaching vegetation and created a rule allowing relief from a neighbor’s tree
encroaching onto the land of another as a nuisance, when the encroaching trees
“cause actual harm or the imminent danger of actual harm.”252
The Court disagreed with Dr. Cline’s assertion that, logically, the Fancher
principles create the existence of a duty because this duty “addresses a narrow
category of actions arising from nuisance caused by the encroachment of
vegetation onto adjoining . . . lands.”253 And “[t]he duties . . . in Fancher and
Smith [—i.e., the Hawaii and Virginia Rules—] are dramatically different than
duties necessary to support an action for personal injury predicated upon a duty
of a landowner regarding the natural decline of trees on his or her property,
which is adjacent to a roadway.”254 Moreover, property owners whose land is
adjacent to a public highway only must “refrain from engaging in any act that
makes the highway more dangerous than in a state of nature or in the state in
which it has been left.”255 Short of having taken an action to make the tree more
dangerous than it was naturally, Dunlora escaped liability. 256
2.

The Dissenting Opinion

Three Justices dissented from the majority’s opinion and argued that the
principles of ordinary negligence should apply here following sic utere. 257 As a
case of first impression, the dissenters considered the varying approaches to the
“not entirely unusual situation” of encroaching trees or vegetation. 258 Their
discussion begins with the Restatement’s imposition of liability on landowners
resulting from trees falling on public highways. 259 But, because multiple
approaches have grown out of the Restatement’s standard, the justices examined
leading jurisdictions’ approaches to the issue. 260

251. Id.
252. Id. at 17.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 18.
256. T he duty owed by Dunlora was “ to refrain from engaging in any act that makes the
highway more dangerous than in a state of nature or in the state in which it has been left. ” Id. Had
Dunlora taken an action to make the highway more dangerous, its conduct would have breached
such duty.
257. Id. at 18–19 (Lemons, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 19–20.
259. See id. at 19 n.3 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF T ORTS § 840(1) (AM. LAW I NST.
1979)) (“ [A] possessor of land is not liable to persons outside the land for a nuisance resulting
solely from a natural condition of the land.”).
260. Id. at 20. Further approaches might grow out of the Restatement ’s standards as the
recently published Restatement (T hird) of T orts section 8 concerns public nuisances resulting in
economic loss. RESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF T ORTS: P HYS. & EMOT. HARM § 8 (AM. LAW I NST.
2010). Importantly, however, section 8 “ does not seek to restate the substantive law of public
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Some jurisdictions, for example, have adopted a rule that considers the
urban/rural distinction and finds no duty to inspect trees in a state of nature in a
rural area. 261 Other jurisdictions blend the division between urban/rural and
focus on “the size, type, and use of the highway and land to determine the proper
liability standard — whether this is a duty to inspect.”262 While other
jurisdictions create a general duty to inspect any trees adjacent to public
highways. 263 Still others impose a duty of reasonable care upon all landowners,
without any specific duty to inspect trees adjacent to highways. 264 Moreover,
the dissenting justices mentioned that the imposition of liability “require[s] the
presence of patent visible decay.”265 Ultimately, the dissent calls for a general
duty of reasonable care suggesting that the court adopt the following rule that a
“landowner should be liable for injuries resulting from a tree falling from his or
her property onto a public highway if he or she knows or has reason to know of
the imminent danger presented by the tree’s death, decay or other visible
defect.”266
The rule the dissenting justices promoted “avoid[s] the rigid dichotomies
expressed in other rules, which have been found unworkable by [other]
courts,”267 and, holds landowners to the same economic efficiencies
fundamental to the sic utere doctrine. 268 However, the dissent could have gone
further and decided on a theory of nuisance, which would have more fully
embraced the economic efficiencies of the sic utere doctrine.
B.

The Doctrine of Waste as a Vector of Force in Decision-Making

In Cline, the Court would have been wise to apply the macro approach used
by courts when determining whether an individual committed the tort of
“waste.” With roots in the common law maximum of sic utere, 269 the common

nuisance 13 except as necessary to explain those cases that produce 14 liability in tort for economic
loss.” Id.
261. Id.; see also Ford v. S.C. Dep’t of T ransp., 492 S.E.2d 811, 814 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997);
Lemon v. Edwards, 344 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Ky. 1961); Zacharias v. Nesbitt, 185 N.W. 295, 296
(Minn. 1921).
262. Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14, 19 (Va. 2012) (Lemons, J., dissenting); Lewis
v. Krussel, 2 P.3d 486, 490–91 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); T aylor v. Olsen, 578 P.2d 779, 782 –83 (Or.
1978).
263. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 20 (Lemons, J., dissenting).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 21.
267. Bidwell, supra note 223, at 1056.
268. Id. at 1057.
269. Smith, supra note 17, at 696 (discussing how the Doctrines of Waste, Public T rust, and
Nuisance grew out of the sic utere doctrine); see also Smith v. Cap Concrete, Inc., 184 Cal. Rptr.
308, 311 (Ct. App. 1982) (“Waste evolved and broadened from a cause of action designed to protect
owners of succeeding estates against the improper conduct of the person in possession which
harmed and affected the inheritance, to a legal means by which any concurrent non -possessory

730

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 67:699

law doctrine of waste protects those with an absolute claim to an estate from
injuries caused to that estate by individuals with less than an absolute claim to
the estate—such as leasehold estates. 270 To constitute waste there needs to be
an act or omission that permanently diminishes or depreciates the value of the
property. 271 There exist three types of waste: voluntary, permissive, and
meliorating. 272 Permissive waste involves negligence or an omission that would
allow for deterioration to the property. 273 Voluntary waste is a “deliberate,
willful, or voluntary destruction or carrying away of something attached to [the
property].”274 Meliorating waste is a special type of waste that is seemingly in
opposition of the theories of permissive and voluntary waste. Technically
considered waste, meliorating waste improves the value of the land instead of
decreasing the value. 275 Courts’ refusals to enter judgments of waste when the
damages are only nominal, and the refusal of courts of equity to enjoin technical

holders of interest in the land are enabled to prevent or restrain harm to the land committed by
persons in possession.”).
270. See 78 AM. JUR. 2 D Waste § 1 (2018); Waste—Ameliorating Waste-Effect of Short-Term
Lease, 31 YALE L.J. 781, 781 (1922) (“ Waste is the destruction or material alteration or
deterioration of the freehold or of the improvements forming a material part thereof, by any person
rightfully in possession but who has not the fee title or the full estate.”); see also Luis v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1092–93 (2016) (“[T]he law of property sometimes allows a person without
a present interest in a piece of property to impose restrictions upon a current owner . . . to prevent
waste.”); Rehman v. State Univ. of N.Y., 596 F. Supp. 2d 643, 660 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) ( “ [A]ctions in
waste are generally relegated to cases where the holder of real property causes a deterioration [to]
the property.”); Cal. Dep’t of T oxic Substances Control v. Payless Cleaners, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1069,
1082 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (defining waste and giving a brief history of the doctrine’s evolution);
Proffitt v. Henderson, 29 Mo. 325, 325 (1860) (“Waste is a lasting damage to the reversion caused
by the destruction, by the tenant for life or years.”). Waste can also occur to personal property
when the property has become part of the real property. Meyer v. Hansen, 373 N.W.2d 392, 395
(N.D. 1985).
271. Waste, supra note 270, at § 1. Importantly, when a court considers waste, its application
of the doctrine is flexible and considers factors like the characteristics of the estate and the type of
property. Id. § 16.
272. See generally id. §§ 5, 7.
273. Jowdy v. Guerin, 457 P.2d 745, 748–50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) (affirming a lower court’s
judgment of waste when the evidence—although not showing the actual cause of deterioration—
reflects the possessors’ failure to protect the property in any manner whatever); see also Keesecker
v. Bird, 490 S.E.2d 754, 770 (W. Va. 1997) (emphasizing that plaintiffs brought a permissive waste
claim where real property and personal property was not being cared for).
274. Waste, supra note 270, at § 5.
275. See id. § 7. In J.H. Bellows Co. v. Covell, the Defendants were developing a golf course
on leased property attempted to change a “ marshy” and “ muck[y]” pond into an artificial lake. 162
N.E. 621, 621 (1927). T he owners of the property threatened to enter upon the leased property to
prevent the improvement to the pond, and the developers brought suit against them. T he owners
of the property brought a counter suit alleging the improvements were waste and sought an
injunction. Id. at 621–22. T he court considered how the improvements to the pond—although
technically waste—resulted in an improvement to the land. Id. at 622. Accordingly, because this
type of meliorating waste is allowed, the court denied the injunction. Id.
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waste where the damages were trivial, has contributed to the theory of
meliorating waste. 276
Whether an act or omission constitutes waste heavily depends on the facts and
circumstances of the particular act or omission. 277 In considering whether the
particular facts constitute waste, an appropriate application “must be shaped and
defined by a balancing of the costs and the benefits of allowing the questioned
acts to continue.”278 The doctrine of waste “mediates between the competing
interests” of parties who have different incentives to maximize the value of
property at different stages in the life of the property. 279 Balancing the costs and
benefits is in the public interest and allows for improvements or alterations to
the property by the tenant which otherwise under a strict liability standard of
waste would be considered waste. 280 Part of this balancing involves the
“average, ordinary reasonable person” and how this ideal person would treat his
own property. 281 Here, utilizing the average, ordinary reasonable person, the
similarity between the doctrines of waste and nuisance is unmistakable.
Waste—like nuisance—has a tendency to depend on what a community
considers waste. 282 The similarities between the two doctrines suggest the most
efficient path to achieving a “waste-less” community and protecting the
underlying goal of the doctrine of waste (i.e., to ensure the property rights of
those with an absolute claim to property are protected283 ) is achieved through
nuisance principles.

276. Ameliorating Waste, 14 HARV. L. REV. 226, 226 (1900).
277. Chosar Corp. v. Owens, 370 S.E.2d 305, 307 (Va. 1988). Waste, however, is not the
ordinary wear and tear that occurs over time and with normal use. See generally Waste, supra note
270, at § 1.
278. Smith, supra note 17, at 696 n.262.
279. See P OSNER, supra, note 14, at 92. For example, as Posner discusses, a tenant will have
an incentive to maximize the present value of the earnings stream obtainable durin g his possession
of the property. On the other side, the person who will inherit full ownership to the estate following
the tenant’s term is concerned with the entire stream of earnings. Id. T he common law doctrine of
waste solves these conflicting incentives with its cost benefit balancing analysis.
280. See Ameliorating Waste, supra note 276, at 226.
281. Smith, supra note 17, at 696 n.262. T he average, ordinary reasonable person is discussed
in Section III. of this Article. As discussed there, the theory of the average ordinary reasonable
person is not without flaws.
282. See Smith, supra note 17, at 696 n.262 (“ T he subject or focus of waste, then, as seen, is
fluid and will vary from community to community and with customs and usages within each. ”).
283. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
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1. The Doctrine of Waste in Cline v. Dunlora South, LLC: Validating
Principles
The Court in Cline did not contemplate the doctrine of waste, and for good
cause, 284 but some properties of the doctrine are floating around in the dissent. 285
Inherent in the Court’s discussion of the damages caused by the tree falling on
Dr. Cline’s vehicle is the principles of waste—diminishment or depreciation of
the value of the property caused by another person’s acts or omissions. The
dissent in Cline argued for an application of negligence following the doctrine
of sic utere, which, as explained above, is part of the foundation of waste. 286
The dissent argues explicitly for a general duty of reasonable care; a reoccurring
theme in the doctrine of waste. 287 Were facts of Cline different and were the
doctrine of waste to apply, Dunlora’s actions would be an example of waste.
Dunlora did not care for the tree, it became dangerous, and c aused damage to
property. 288
The theory to which the dissent in Cline eludes validates the principles of the
tort of waste. The dissent would hold liable a landowner who did not remedy a
dead, decaying, or otherwise visibly defective tree. 289 This rule would
incorporate the economic considerations fundamental to the doctrine of waste.
Waste is about the balance between the present tenant’s rights versus the
absolute owner’s rights. 290 That balance is best achieved with a cost based
consideration. The tenant is in the best position to ensure the property’s value
is not harmed. However, as seen with courts of equity and meliorating waste, a
court will not find a tenant liable strictly because the elements of waste exists;
there must be some harm to the absolute owner’s interest. This is the
fundamental cost benefit balancing judges are asked to do with the doctrine of
waste and shows how the doctrine solves the issue at the macro level. Similarly,
in Cline the court could have used a similar macro approach to help guide them
in their decision.

284. Waste is a tort concerning damages to real property or personal property that is a part of
the real property, similar to fixtures, caused by a person with less than full rights to the property.
See Waste, supra note 270, at § 1. In Cline, someone in less than full possession of the property
did not cause the damages to Dr. Cline and his vehicle. Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14,
15 (Va. 2012). Rather, the damage was caused by the defendant ’s property; the doctrine of waste
would not apply. See id.
285. See generally id. at 18–21 (Lemons, J., dissenting).
286. See id. at 20. See also supra note 270 and accompanying text.
287. See Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 20–21 (Lemons, J., dissenting) (quoting Gibson v. Hunsberger,
428 S.E.2d 489, 492 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993)). See also supra note 175 and accompanying text.
288. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 15. T his would be similar to Keesecker v. Bird, where the appellees
allowed an injury to the property through their inaction. 490 S.E.2d 754, 769 (W. Va. 1997).
289. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 21 (Lemons, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
290. See supra notes 269–270 and accompanying text.
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2.

Pleading Nuisance in the Alternative

The dissent from Cline and Dr. Cline’s amended complaint hint at a practical
alternative for tree-related cases. 291 Instead of relying entirely on a negligence
theory of liability—a theory, which as described earlier is deeply flawed292 —
plaintiffs might be wise to also plead a nuisance claim in the alternative. 293
Although the lines between nuisance and negligence have gradually blurred over
time, 294 it would not be unprecedented to bring these claims together, and “there
is no persuasive or compelling reason why a plaintiff should not be able to allege
both negligence and nuisance.”295 Pleading nuisance in the alternative would
serve as a useful backstop for instances where a court might not find all of the
elements of a negligence claim satisfied.
Still, plaintiffs cannot rely only on pleading nuisance in the alternative. As
witnessed in Cline and as discussed in Dobbs’ Law of Torts, if a nuisance action
succeeds or fails upon the defendant’s negligence, the case would depend on the
negligence elements being satisfied. 296 What Cline illustrates, then, is that to
plead successfully nuisance in the alternative, the defendant’s negligence cannot
be the central issue. 297 Rather, had Dr. Cline more clearly pleaded negligence

291. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 21 (Lemons, J., dissenting); Amended Complaint, Cline v. Dunlora
S., LLC, 81 Va. Cir. 235 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2010) (No. CL1000012200), 2010 WL 9100619. However,
Dr. Cline needed to have pleaded nuisance more successfully so as to bring the question before the
courts.
292. For example, in Cline the court struggled with whether Dunlora owed a duty to ensure the
tree did not cause injury or whether Dunlora only owed a duty not to make the tree more dangerous
than it was naturally. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 18. See also Smith & Fernandez, supra note 206.
293. See Lewis v. Krussel, 2 P.3d 486, 489 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); see also James T .R. Jones,
Trains, Trucks, Trees and Shrubs: Vision-Blocking Natural Vegetation and a Landowner’s Duty to
Those Off the Premises, 39 VILL . L. REV. 1263, 1266 n.16 (1994) (“ Counsel for injured travelers
always should consider whether asserting a nuisance claim (or claims) in addition to an ordinary
negligence claim might prove beneficial.”).
294. Howard L. Oleck, Nuisance in a Nutshell, 5 CLEV. MARSHALL L. REV. 148, 149 (1956).
See also, William M. Cromer, Absolute and Qualified Nuisance in Ohio, 9 OHIO ST. L.J., 164, 164–
65 (1948). For example, in McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, Justice Cardozo discussed that the
nuisance in the case grew out of the defendant ’s negligence. 160 N.E. 391, 391 (N.Y. 1928). Still,
“ [n]egligence and nuisance . . . are not always mutually exclusive legal concepts.” Jost v. Dairyland
Power Co-op., 172 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Wis. 1969).
295. P ETER N. SWISHER ET AL ., VIRGINIA P RACTICE SERIES: T ORT AND P ERSONAL I NJURY
LAW § 8.1 (West rev. ed. 2015); accord W. P AGE KEETON ET AL ., P ROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF T ORTS § 87, p. 622 (5th ed. 1984) (“ The existence of a nuisance to the land does not of
course preclude an independent tort action for ordinary negligence resulting in interference with
the bodily security of the individual.”). See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Blue Springs, 904 S.W.2d 322,
328 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (plaintiffs filed suit against defendants under two theories: maintaining a
public nuisance and negligence).
296. DOBBS, supra note 163, at § 400; accord Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 18. See also Breeding ex
rel. Breeding v. Hensley, 519 S.E.2d 369, 373 (Va. 1999) (“ [A] Town is liable for maintaining a
public nuisance only if the plaintiffs can establish the T own employees were negligent.”).
297. See DOBBS, supra note 163, at § 400; Wells v. Whitaker, 151 S.E.2d 422, 434 (Va. 1966)
(discussing circumstances where it is not necessary to allege or prove negligence).

734

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 67:699

and nuisance as two distinct causes of action instead of allowing the Court to
blend them together, his nuisance claim could have proceeded even though his
negligence claim failed. This type of pleading would allow the courts to be more
efficient when allocating the costs of injury.
CONCLUSION
The calculus of causation for establishing negligence has become a paradox
to the ideal of corrective justice and the need for the efficient and expeditious
administration of justice. 298 As seen, there are both latent and patent ambiguities
in theory and in application of the tort of negligence. 299 The prolonged demise
of the pivotal “cast member” in the causation saga is the average, ordinary,
reasonable person. Accordingly, when an action is followed which a reasonable
person would not follow, or when action is—contrariwise—not undertaken that
a reasonable person would pursue, negligence results. 300
Today, the very notion of a citizenry composed of average, ordinary
reasonable persons strains the limits of credulity as statistics show the already
high rates of illiteracy and cognitive impairment growing. 301 The consequence
of this growth means, simply, that more and more “aggrieved” parties will be
litigating what they perceive are civil wrongs based on unreasonable conduct.
The level of judicial scrutiny of every day transactions in the marketplace should
be tempered by the status of the parties and, more specifically, a determination
of whether one or more of the party litigants is impaired cognitively. This
condition to exist should, at a minimum, be accepted as a mitigating factor for
the courts to consider when ruling on the merits of an actionable claim, or
alternatively, reforming a contract in dispute.
A new emphasis on objective standards of conduct—rather than normative
standards which are used traditionally in testing the conduct of the average,
ordinary, reasonable persons vis-à-vis causation for the torts of negligence to be
established—is a recognition of the high rate of illiteracy in America302 and an
effort to allow more opportunities for corrective justice. Accepting the notion
that, at the center, every legal case resolves around the need to test the
reasonableness of conduct by the parties, 303 leads—then—to the conclusion that

298. See MORAN , supra note 4, at 3–4; Rodgers, supra note 5, at 9–11.
299. See Gardner, supra note 25, at 31–32; Miller & Perry, supra note 151, at 324–25;
Zipursky, supra note 15, at 2132 (discussing ambiguities of the reasonable person standard).
300. See Miller & Perry, supra note 151, at 325.
301. See supra notes 16, 61–65, 84 and accompanying text; see generally Cupp, supra note 64
(discussing whether granting legal personhood to animals based on cognitive abilities would
endanger the rights of individuals with severe cognitive impairments).
302. See supra notes 16, 61–65, 84 and accompanying text.
303. See P OSNER, supra note 143, at 272. (“ [I]t sets no higher aspiration for the judge than
that his decisions be reasonable in the light of the warring interests in the cases, although a reason
able decision is not necessarily a ‘right’ one.”).
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defining reasonableness is of paramount concern in attempting to reach a level
of corrective justice.
The question then becomes the extent to which the legal system is willing to
maintain this doctrine on “life support” and thereby “accommodate[]
imprecision”304 rather than go with a more efficient pathway toward achieving
efficiency in decision making by using—generically—the standard for
determining reasonable conduct as set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
for establishing liability for nuisance. 305 This proposed shift in thinking, policy,
and practice would go far to resolve the ongoing cri de coeur—or outcry—
raging over the extended use of the multi-purpose tort of negligence as the
remedial panacea for nearly all civil wrongs.
The harmonious balancing of interests that Cardozo opined was the only hope
for progress in the law, 306 is best achieved by adopting the balancing test set out
for determining the reasonableness of conduct under the Restatement. 307 The
courts should test parties in litigation, in order to determine which of them acted
more rationally or soundly from an economic standpoint. 308 Courts might ask
how their rulings could best achieve economic (or corrective) justice.
Secondarily, courts could ask whose interests are best served individually, from
micro economic analysis or collectively, from a macro or societal point of view.
Since the “spirit of the times” is a capitalistic society rooted in “economic
efficiency,”309 the courts should—then—strive for resolutions that make “the
most sense [and are] both efficient and fair.”310
The “simple language,”311 or lingua franca, that Camus sought in everyday
discourse, will never for the law, be attainable. Yet, by lessening the “death
grip” on the notion of an average, ordinary, reasonable person so necessary in
proving causation for negligence, and utilizing, instead, objective cost/benefit
factors for determining the reasonableness of conduct, progress will have been
made toward achieving this aspirational goal set by Camus.

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Rodgers, supra note 5, at 34.
See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
CARDOZO , supra note 147, at 114, 115 n.25.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF T ORTS §§ 822, 827–28 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
P OSNER, supra note 14, at 3.
Id. at 342. See Elliot, supra note 41, at 62–63.
MERRILL & SMITH , supra note 196, at 64.
Zaretsky, supra note 1.
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